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Abstract
I study the e¤ects on economic welfare of an import tari¤ on foreign
movies with the revenues either to subsidize output or projects of home
producers. The analysis indicates that the degree of the optimum inter-
vention reduces the greater is the market for home movies outside the
country.
ÁREA: MACROECONOMIA APLICACA
1Title: “Movie Industry: Protecion and
the Size of the Market”
1 Introduction
The American movie industry dominates the world cinema. Although it does
not make most feature movies, it is the only one that reaches every market in the
world. For example, the market share of the American motion pictures in the
European Union was about 70% in 1996. In Canada, 96% of all movies shown in
the theaters are foreign, primarily American. Even in Japan, America accounts
for more than half the …lm industry. In contrast, foreign movies represents only
a tiny fraction of the American market, with a share of less than 3%.
It is no surprise that the supremacy of the American movie industry triggers
movements in the rest of the world to protect their local producers. In France,
there is a consumption tax on all movie tickets and the revenues are used to
…nance the French movie makers. The Brazilian government provide tax exemp-
tion, up to a certain limit, to private companies that …nance cultural projects,
including obviously new movies. There is pressure from many countries to ex-
empt cultural goods from international agreements lowering trade barriers, with
the justi…cation that free trade can threat national cultures.1
From a theoretical point of view, there is justi…cation for government inter-
vention to protect and/or provide …nancial support for local industries charac-
terized by increasing returns to scale, such as the movie industry.2 The advan-
tage of the American producers is exactly the fact that they can exploit a big
market at home. They can dillute the high …xed costs in their own market and
sell abroad at low marginal cost. Instead of relying or demanding protection,
one can argue that producers from other countries should be more aggressive in
the international market and not restrict their focus on the domestic market.
However, the possibility of exploiting the global market scale is limited to these
producers for one particular reason. Di¤erently from other goods traded in the
international market, movies have some characteristics that are very speci…c to
some markets. One obvious example is the language. American consumers do
not enjoy watching movies in French, whereas this is a feature demanded by
French consumers. As a result, there may exist an additional reason, beyond
the traditional one, to protect an industry characterized by increasing returns
to scale as the outside market is restricted. This possibility is analyzed here.
In this paper, I develop a model of a small country that produces a ho-
mogenous good and home movies, the latter characterized by scale economies
1For more details on this pressure, see The Economist (1998).
2See Helpman and Krugman (1989) for a review of the theoretical models with increasing
returns to scale and the e¤ects of trade protection on welfare. Bhagwati (2002) recognizes the
theoretical justi…cation for protection of selected industries characterized by imperfect com-
petition. However, he argues that the gains may not be large enough to justify intervention.
Moreover, he adds that intervention may make matters worse due to directly unproductive
pro…t-seeking activities.
2and product di¤erentiation, standard features in the literature.3 As there is
monopolistic competition in the movie industry, there is room for government
intervention. I consider two types of policies. First, the government imposes an
import tax on foreign movies to …nance the output subsidy to the home produc-
ers. Second, the government imposes the same tax to subsidize the home movie
projects. Both interventions are welfare improving. The major conclusion that
emerges from the analysis is that the optimal import tari¤ is lower, under both
types of intervention, the greater is the market for home movies outside the
country. In other words, the degree of the optimal intervention reduces if the
home movie industry can exploit a greater market abroad. There are two papers
close related to this one, Flam and Helpman (1987) and Francois and Ypersele
(2002). However, neither one considers the impact of the size of the market
abroad on the degree of intervention.4
The model is developed in section 2. Then, in section 3, I characterize
the equilibrium conditions. Welfare implications are discussed in section 4 and
conclusions are drawn in the last section.
2 Model
There are assumed to be a large number of potential home and foreign movies.
There are two types of individuals living in the home country. Type 1individuals
get utility only from consuming home movies. Type 2 individuals care only
about consumption of foreign movies. There are “fL” individuals of the former
type and “(1¡ f)L” individuals of the last type, where 0 < f < 1 and L > 0.




















3For examples, see Krugman (1980) and Krugman (1981).
4Flam and Helpman (1987) has a similar framework to the one developed here. They con-
clude that the welfare consequences of industrial policies depend on the details of production
structure and preferences, except for asmall tari¤ which is always welfare improving. Francois
and Ypersele (2002) develops a model to explore the possibility that restrictions on trade of








where ci and pi are, respectively, the consumption and price of the ith home
movie, c¤
i and p¤ are, respectively, the consumption and price of the ith foreign
movie, t is the import tax on foreign movies, and w is the wage rate.5 The
parameter µ is the same for both groups and 0 < µ < 1.6 The number of home
movies actually produced, n, will be assumed to be large, although smaller than
the potential range.7
There will be assumed to be only one factor of production, labor. Total labor
is equal to the home population, L. The home country produces two types of
goods, the home di¤erentiated movies (xi) and an homogenous good (T).
In the movie sector, I assume that every movie i is produced with the same
cost structure:
li = ® + ¯xi
where li is labor used in producing the ith movie, and xi is the number of units
of this movie, with ®;¯ > 0. The term ® can be seen as the project cost of the
motion picture, whereas ¯ is the constant production cost per unit of output.
Therefore, average cost declines at all levels of output, but at a diminishing
rate. This sector is characterized by monopolistic competition, with each …rm
producing a di¤erent movie and having some monopoly power, but with entry of
new …rms driving monopoly pro…ts to zero. Let ¼i be the pro…ts of the producer
of movie i. It can bewritten as:
¼i = (1+ z)pixi ¡ (®(1¡ s) + ¯xi) w;
where z is the output subsidy, and s is the project subsidy. Output and project
subsidy are two alternative ways of supporting the home movie industry.
In the homogenous good sector, which is characterized by perfect competi-
tion, I assume that the cost structure is such that there is constant marginal
cost and no …xed cost. Therefore, total labor used in the production of T units
of the homogenous good is equal to:
lT = ¯T T, with ¯ T > 0.
5Without loss of generality, I assume that p¤
i =p¤, for all i.
6As in Krugman (1981), I use the ln utility function because of two useful properties. First,
it implies that every producer faces a demand curve with elasticity 1
(1¡µ). Second, it simpli…es
the welfare analysis performed below.
7An alternative approach would be to have all people alike, with a taste for both types
of movies, home and foreign. The results would be similar. Moreover, the results would be
exactly the same if total expenditures on each type of movie are …xed.
4It is assumed that home individuals do not obtain utility from consuming the
homogenous good. Therefore, this good is only sold in the foreign market. In
order to have an equilibrium in the trade balance, total expenditures in foreign
movies by type 2 individuals have to be equal to total expenditures in home
movies by foreign individuals (w¤) plus the total sales of the homogenous good
in the foreign market. Hence, the trade balance equilibrium condition is:




where the exchange rate is set to be equal to one (the numeraire), pT is the
foreign price of the homogenous product, and x¤
i is the number of units of
the foreign movie i imported by the home country. As home individuals do not
consume the homogenous good, it will be only produced in the home country as a
way of obtaining resources to purchase foreign movies. I will impose some limits
on the size of w¤ and restrain my analysis to the case in which total expenditures
on foreign movies (p¤ P
i x¤
i) is always greater than total expenditures in home
movies by foreign individuals (w¤). In other words, it is always necessary to
produce some amount of the homogenous good in order to …nance total imports,
that is, pTT > 0.
The home country is considered to be small. This assumption implies that
it faces a given number of foreign movies, n¤, a given price of the di¤erentiated
foreign movies, p¤, a given foreign spending on di¤erentiated home movies, w¤,
and a given foreign price of the homogenous product, pT.
In order to complete the basic model, I need to spell the government’s prob-
lem. Its objective function is to maximize the home country’s welfare function,














I mentioned above that the government can implement two types of policies.
It can either provide an output or a project subsidy to the movie industry.
Resources to …nance either policy is obtained only through the introduction of
import tax (t) on foreign movies. The government budget constraint has to be











I turn now to the solution to the model in order to obtain the conditions that
characterize the equilibrium.










i=1, w, T, n, t, s, z, , such that: (i) given
fpig
n
i=1, n and w, fcig
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i=1 solves the type 2 individual’s problem; (iii) given pT, and w, T
solves the problem of the …rms in the homogenous sector; (iv) given fpjgj6=i,
and w, pi solves the problem of the …rm that produces home movie i; (v) the
zero pro…t condition holds in the movie sector, that is, ¼i = 0, for all i; (vi)
the labor market is in equilibrium, that is, L = lT +
P






i=1, and n, t, s, and z solve the government’s problem; and (viii) the trade
balance is in equilibrium.
In order to …nd the competitive equilibrium, I will proceed in the following
way. First, I will obtain the demand functions for home movies from the con-
sumer’s problem. Second, the pro…t-maximizing behavior by …rms is derived
and the zero-pro…t condition indicates total output of each home movie. Third,
the trade balance equilibrium condition indicates the amount of homogenous
good to be produced. Finally, the labor market equilibrium condition indicates
the equilibrium number of di¤erentiated home movie.










where ¸1 is the marginal utility of income. Since all individuals type 1 are equal,
then xi = fLci. Hence, the above equation can be rearranged in order to obtain













Using this demand curve in the …rm’s …rst-order condition, I obtain the




Using the mark-up price, the pro…t function becomes:
8For simplicity, I omitt here the foreign consumer’s problem. However, it is assumed that
each …rm faces the same demand curve of home and foreign consumers with an elasticity of
1
(1¡µ). In this case, each …rm charges the same price at home and abroad. Alternatively, it
could be assumed that the demand elastiticities of foreign and home consumers were di¤erent.
In this case, if price discrimination were not allowed, the same price would still be set at home
and abroad and would be a combination of the di¤erent elasticities.
6¼i = µ
¡1¯wxi ¡ (®(1¡ s) + ¯xi)w:





The implication is that the price and the quantity produced of each di¤erentiated
home movie are the same.
Wage is determined from the …rst-order condition of the …rms operating in





From the trade balance condition and assuming without loss of generality










From type 2 individual’s problem, one can show that he consumes the same
amount of each of the n¤foreign movies available. As a result, the representative
type 2 agent buys c¤ = w
n¤p¤(1+t) units of each foreign movie. Since there are
(1¡ f)L type 2 individuals, total units of foreign movies imported are equal to
n¤x¤ = n¤(1 ¡ f)Lc¤ =
(1¡f)Lw









In order to …nd the number of home movies produced, I turn now to the
labor market equilibrium condition:
L = lT +
X
i




Using equation (2) and (4) in the above equation, the number of di¤erent













7As a result of the steps followed in this section, I obtain all variables of the
model as a function of the policy variables under the control of the government
(t, z, and s). Hence, it is now possible to analyze the impact of the di¤erent
government policies on the economic welfare. Before turning to this analysis
in the following section, it is convenient to rewrite the government’s budget
constraint, using the expressions obtained in this section for n¤x¤, p and x.











I consider two types of policies and analyze their e¤ects on the economic welfare.
First, the government imposes an import tax on foreign movies to …nance the
output subsidy to the home producers. Second, the government imposes the
same tax to subsidize the home movie projects.
In order to proceed with the analysis, it is necessary to follow two steps.
First, I …nd the expressions for n, c, and c¤ as a function of t, the import tax,
which is the choice variable for the government. Second, using these expressions
in the welfare function, I obtain the optimal import tax. Next subsections
analyze each one of these policies.
4.1 Import Tax and Output Subsidy
Under the scheme in which the government provides output subsidy …nanced
through import tax, s is set equal to zero. Then, the government budget con-
straint (equation (6))becomes:
z =
t(1 ¡ f)L(1¡ µ)
n(1 + t)® ¡ t(1¡ f)L(1 ¡ µ)
: (7)
Using (3) and the assumption that pT = p¤ in individual type 2’s budget






Total imports of foreign movies decline with the import tax, as it should
be. Government intervention does not a¤ect individual’s wages9 and p¤ is …xed
and exogenously given. With greater tax rate, home individuals who cares only
about foreign movies consume less goods. Obviously, they are made worst o¤
with the import tax.















Output subsidy …nanced through import taxes allows each …rm that pro-
duces home movies to charge a lower price and still have positive pro…ts. As
a consequence, more …rms are attracted to this market and it increases the
number of di¤erentiated home movies (n) available in the new equilibrium.
From equation (9), one can see that the greater is the import tax, the greater
is the number of di¤erentiated home movies produced. As less goods are im-
ported, it is necessary a lower production of the homogenous good T in order
to be reached a trade balance. Therefore, more resources can be devoted to the
production of home movies, which increases n.
Using (3), (1), (7), and (9) in individual type 1’s budget constraint, one can
obtain the expression of c as a function of t:
c(t) =
®µpT
(1¡ µ)¯ [fpT L + ¯T w¤]
: (10)
Under this policy, note that c does not depend on t. The intuition behind
this result runs as follows. On the one hand, with the reduction in the price
of home movies, each consumer would be willing to consume more units of
each home movie. On the other hand, as a greater number of home movies is
available, each consumer would be inclined to reduce the consumption of the old
home movies in order to consume positive units of the new home movies. The
net e¤ect, with the log utility function, is to maintain unaltered the number of
units consumed of each home movie (c).10
Note that the individuals who care only about the consumption of home
movies are better o¤ with the imposition of import tax: c does not change but
n increases.
The number of di¤erent foreign movies produced does not change with the
local government intervention. As the home country is small, this number is
…xed and equal to n¤.
Government’s problem is to choose the import tax that maximizes the wel-
fare function W. On the one hand, import tax bene…ts individuals who consume
home movies. On the other hand, it hurts individuals who cares only about for-
eign movies. Its problem is the following:
max
t
W = f ln[n(t)c(t)µ]1=µ + (1 ¡ f)ln[n¤c¤(t)µ]1=µ;
subject to equations (7), (8), (9), and (10).
The solution to the government’s problem leads to the following results.
10Krugman (1980) discuss this issue and notes that in order to get an increase in scale,
it must be assumed that the demand facing each individual …rm becomes more elastic as
the number of …rms increases. As in Krugman (1980), I use the constant elasticity case for
simplicity.
9Proposition 2 Under a policy regime with import tax and output subsidy, the
optimum tax is equal to topt =
(µ¡1¡1)pTfL¡¯T w¤





f, (ii) if w¤ >
(1¡µ)
µ fLw, then topt < 0; (iii) if w¤ <
(1¡µ)
µ fLw,
then topt > 0.
Proposition 3 Under a policy regime with import tax and output subsidy, dtopt
dw¤ <
0.
The main point is what justi…es the potential gain in welfare due to the
introduction of the combination of import tari¤ and output subsidy. Consider
…rst the simplest case in which w¤ is equal to zero. With this assumption, the
optimal import tari¤ is positive. With a positive import tax, total imports is
lower. As a consequence, the production of the homogenous good T, which
is characterized by constant returns to scale, becomes less important. It oc-
curs because homogenous good is only used to …nance the purchase of foreign
movies, the only imported good in this model. At the same time, it becomes
more lucrative to produce home movies, a sector characterized by increasing
returns to scale, with the boost received by the output subsidy provided by the
government. As a result of the government intervention, the gains to consumers
of home movies (type 1 consumers) surpass the losses of consumers of foreigns
movies (type 2 consumers), increasing the economic welfare. The di¤erence in
the nature of the production process in the home movies sector vis-à-vis the
homogenous good sector explains this result.
Proposition 2 indicates that the optimal import tari¤ is negatively related
with the size of the market for home movies abroad, that is, with w¤. A greater
w¤ works exactly in the same way as the introduction of the import tax men-
tioned above. When it increases, there is a change in the production mix in
favor of the sector characterized by increasing returns to scale. In other words,
there is a shift in the home production from the homogenous good to the home
movies. As exports increase, it is less necessary to produce the homogenous
good to exchange for foreign movies. As a result, the optimal import tari¤ is
lower.
Moreover, proposition 1indicates that the optimal import tari¤ is negative as
w¤ becomes greater than a critical value. The intuition behind this result is the
following. As discussed above, w¤ plays the same role as t. As w¤ increases, the
additional bene…ts to type 1 consumers diminish and they do not compensate
the losses incurred by type 2 consumers of a greater import tax, due to the
concavity of the utility function. It reaches a point, when w¤ is beyond the
critical value, that an increase in the welfare function can only be obtained by
subsidizing the consumption (import of foreign movies) of type 2 consumers,
that is, t < 0.
4.2 Import Tax and Project Subsidy
Under the scheme in which the government provides project subsidy …nanced
through import tax, z is set equal to zero. Equation (6), which represents





As in the previous subsection, using (3) and the assumption that pT = p¤ in






As under the another type of government intervention discussed in the pre-
vious subsection, those individuals who consume only foreign movies are made
worst o¤ with this new policy too. The explanation is the same.















Project subsidy gives an incentive for …rms to invest in new projects. It can
be shown that the number of home movies (n) increases with the import tax,
that is, the derivative of n with respect to t is positive. Hence, when an import
tax is imposed to …nance the project subsidy, it increases the number of home
movies.
Using (1) in individual type 1’s budget constraint, I obtain the expression





Note that the number of units of each home movie consumed reduces with
the import tax, as n increases. The explanation behind this result is the follow-
ing. As the price charged by each …rm does not change with the introduction of
project subsidy11, and there is a greater variety of home movies, the consump-
tion of each home movie available is necessarily lower.
Note that, with the government intervention through import tax plus project
subsidy, the individuals who care only about the consumption of home movies
choose to consume less units of each movie but they take advantage of a greater
variety of those movies. In other words, c decreases and n increases. They are
necessarily better o¤ with this change as they could have opted to keep the same
pattern of consumption without the government intervention but they choose
not to do that.
The number of di¤erent foreign movies produced does not change with this
new type of home government intervention. This number is …xed and given
exogenously by n¤.
11See equation (1).
11Government’s problem is to choose the import tax that maximizes the wel-
fare function W. Its problem is the following:
max
t
W = f ln[n(t)c(t)
µ)





subject to equations (11), (12), (13), and (14).
The solution to the government’s problem leads to the following results.
Proposition 4 Under a policy regime with import tax and project subsidy, the
optimum import tax is equal to topt =
(1¡µ)[(1¡µ)fLpT¡µ¯Tw¤]
µ[(1¡µf)LpT +(1¡µ)¯T w¤]. Hence: (i) if
w¤ = 0, then topt =
f(1¡µ)2
µ(1¡µf ) (ii) if w¤ >
(1¡µ)
µ fLw, then topt < 0; (iii) if
w¤ <
(1¡µ)
µ fLw, then topt > 0.
Proposition 5 Under a policy regime with import tax and project subsidy,
dtopt
dw¤ < 0:
The results obtained above are similar to the ones found in the previous
subsection with the same explanations. Hence, both types of government inter-
vention have exactly the same impact in terms of economic welfare.
5 Conclusion
It is well known in the economic literature that there is room for government
to intervene in industries characterized by increasing returns to scale. However,
when one deals with the movie industry, there is one additional complication.
The possibility of exploiting the global market scale is limited to producers
from a small country. Di¤erently from other goods traded in the international
market, movies have some characteristics that are very speci…c to some markets.
One obvious example is the language.
The analysis above indicates that the size of external markets to home movie
producers a¤ects the degree of the optimal government intervention to correct
the ine¢ciencies of a market characterized by increasing returns to scale or
monopolistic competition. The optimal import tari¤, with the revenues used
either to subsidize production or projects, is lower the greater is the external
market to the home movies produced. A greater external market induces a shift
in the home production from the homogenous good, characterized by constant
returns to scale, to the home movies.
The di¤erence in the nature of the production process in the home movies
vis-à-vis the homogenous good sector explains the above result. As in Flam
and Helpman (1987), the existence of other non-competitive industries that
produce with economies of scale may reduce or eliminate the welfare e¤ect of the
tari¤. However, if one takes two industries with the same production structure
(with economies of scale), home preferences toward their products and etc, a
protection of the industry with less access to the foreign market would be welfare
improving. This result also would hold for other cultural activities other than
12the …lm industry produced under increasing returns to scale such as radio and
television programming, literature or print media.
It is important to add that, in spite of the above results, one should be cau-
tious in adopting policies to protect cultural industries. First, the introduction
of import tari¤ may lead to retaliation from other countries. Second, the gains
associated with the economies of scale may not be large enough from an empir-
ical point of view to justify intervention. Third, it is not an easy task to de…ne
the producers who should receive the subsidies. It is not di¢cult to …nd stories
of public money being directed to producers who do not need it or would have
developed their projects anyway without any aid. Finally, the misuse of public
money is always a possibility.
6 Appendix
Proposition 2: Under a policy regime with import tax and output subsidy, the
optimum tax is equal to topt =
(µ¡1¡1)pT fL¡¯Tw¤





f, (ii) if w¤ >
(1¡µ)
µ fLw, then topt < 0; (iii) if w¤ <
(1¡µ)
µ fLw,
then topt > 0.







(1 + t)pTL ¡ pT(1 ¡ f)L + (1+ t)¯Twf¤
¡ ln(1 + t);
and
ln(c
¤) = ln(1) ¡ ln(n
¤¯T) ¡ ln(1 + t):
Using the above expressions in the welfare function, taking the derivative with




¡1 ¡ 1)pTfL ¡ ¯ Tw¤
pTL + ¯ Tw¤
Proposition 3: Under a policy regime with import tax and output subsidy,
dtopt
dw¤ < 0.
Proof. From the expression for the optimal import tax obtained in the
previous proposition, it is straightforward to show that
dtopt
dw¤ < 0:
Proposition 4: Under a policy regime with import tax and project subsidy,
the optimum import tax is equal to topt =
(1¡µ)[(1¡µ)fLpT ¡µ¯Tw¤]
µ[(1¡µf)LpT +(1¡µ)¯Tw¤]. Hence: (i)
if w¤ = 0, then topt =
f (1¡µ)2
µ(1¡µf) (ii) if w¤ >
(1¡µ)
µ fLw, then topt < 0; (iii) if
w¤ <
(1¡µ)
µ fLw, then topt > 0.




(1+ t)(1¡ µ)pTL ¡ (1¡ f)L(1 ¡ µ)pT + ¯Tw
f(1 + t)(1 ¡ µ) + µt(1¡ f)LpT
¤
¡
¡ln(1 + t) ¡ ln(pT ®);
ln(c) = ¡ ln
£
(1 + t)(1 ¡ µ)pT L ¡ (1 ¡ f)L(1 ¡ µ)pT + ¯T wf(1+ t)(1¡ µ) + µt(1 ¡ f)LpT
¤
+





ln(c¤) = ln(1) ¡ ln(n¤¯T) ¡ ln(1 + t):
Using the above expressions in the welfare function, taking





(1¡ µ) fLpT ¡ µ¯ Twf¤
µ [(1¡ µf)LpT + (1¡ µ)¯ Twf]
.
Proposition 5: Under a policy regime with import tax and project subsidy,
dtopt
dw¤ < 0:
Proof. From the expression for the optimal import tax obtained in the
previous proposition, it is straightforward to show that dtopt
dw¤ < 0:
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